Despite advances in contemporary research on the European Administrative Space (EAS), no widespread understanding about its meaning, mechanisms and significance yet exists. This research agenda paper offers a comprehensive conceptualisation of EAS and takes stock of accumulated lessons learned. It is suggested that the rise of EAS features a transformation of administrative order that analytically can be grasped in terms of four analytical dimensions: independence, integration, co-optation and institutionalisation. Taken together, these elements suggest that EAS features the transformation of the inherent administrative order and the rise of an emergent common administrative system. The purpose of this research agenda paper essay is three-folded. Our first ambition is conceptual by offering a new account of EAS. The second ambition is empirical examining the varied and rich research agendas currently under way. Our final ambition is to stimulate further research along the conceptual map suggested. The empirical laboratory consists of key institutions of EAS, notably the European Commission, the European Parliament administration, EU agencies, EU committees, and domestic agencies.
Introduction 1
Despite advances in contemporary research on the European Administrative Space (EAS), no widespread understanding about its meaning, mechanisms and significance yet exists. This research agenda paper offers a comprehensive conceptualisation of EAS and takes stock of accumulated empirical lessons learned from its development. It is suggested that the rise of EAS features a transformation of administrative order that analytically can be grasped in terms of four analytical dimensions: independence, integration, co-optation and institutionalisation. The paper suggests that these dimensions envisage the transformation of administrative order and the rise of an emergent common administrative system. As seen from this stock-taking exercise, these dimensions are reflected in contemporary research on EAS.
First, EAS necessitates the rise of independent administrative capacity at a European level, notably the rise of relatively permanent and separate institutions -organised according to principles of organisation that cross-cut domestic government institutions -that are able to act relatively independently from member-state governments. Secondly, the rise of EAS requires some degree of integration of this independent European administrative capacity. This entails both the inter-institutional integration of administrative structures at European Union (EU) level and the intrainstitutional integration of each institution thus reinforcing internal administrative hierarchies. Third, EAS entails that this independent and integrated European administrative capacity is able to co-opt administrative sub-centres by stealth. That is, there is a mutual process of integration ('engrenage') of domestic agencies and relevant EU administrative structures. Moreover, EU institutions may also co-opt other international bureaucracies thus integrating global administrative architectures. Fourth, the rise of a common administrative space involves not only structural relationships among institutions but also the institutionalisation of shared values and procedures among the actors involved. Those common values may be more important in defining the administrative space than are more formal elements of governance and administration.
The purpose of this research agenda paper is three-folded. Our first ambition is conceptual by offering a new account of EAS. The second ambition is empirical examining the varied and rich research agendas currently under way. Our final ambition is to stimulate further research along the conceptual map suggested. The reader should notice that there is a deliberate bias in this agenda paper towards recent literature. In doing this the paper furthermore responds to calls for studying unsettled administrative spaces that are continuously evolving. The EU has been pictured as 'an institutional building site' (Olsen 2010: 81) . Evolving administrative spaces are important to understand because such systems 'are especially likely to call attention to phenomena and mechanisms that are not easily observed in well-entrenched, stable polities' (Olsen 2010: 12) . The unsettled nature of EAS may be further accentuated by the present European crisis. During periods of stress and uncertainty, as the one witnessed in Europe at present, existing balances in EAS as regards institutional independence, integration, co-optation and institutionalisation may change.
This stock taking exercise proceeds as follows: The next section reviews the main lessons learned as regards the rise of EAS in recent literature. This section is sequenced in two steps. First, a conceptual discussion suggests that we have seen two generations of study on EAS. This paper draws attention to the second generation of research where EAS features order transformation and administrative centre formation. The second step of the paper offers an empirical re-examination of research as regards institutional independence, integration, co-optation and institutionalisation of EAS. The empirical laboratories covered by this review essay are limited. Certain institutions are excluded, such as the Union Council Secretariat, the administration of the European Court of Justice, the administration of the European Central Bank, and probably many others. The main focus of this analysis is set on a limited set of key institutions of EAS, notably the European Commission (Commission), the European Parliament (EP) administration, EU agencies, EU committees, and domestic agencies.
Lessons learned
Not surprisingly, recent scholarship has diverse understandings of EAS. Questions have centred on what such a space contains, whether there are one or several spaces, what has caused its emergence, and what implications such space(s) may have for domestic government institutions and processes (see Heidbreder 2009 ). We have seen basically two generations of study of EAS. This paper draws attention to the second generation of research.
 The first wave of research emphasised convergence of administrative systems and policies. EAS featured the convergence of administrative systems around some shared forms. One early contribution to this strand of research defined EAS as European administrative convergence, or the 'convergence on a common European model' (Olsen 2003: 506) . Following Olsen, Hofmann and Turk (2006) and Hofmann (2008) conceive of EAS as the emergence of a multilevel and nested networkadministration where institutions at different levels of government 'are linked together in the performance of tasks […] ' (Hofmann and Turk 2006: 583) . Following this strand of research, Amoretti and Musilla (2011) show how e-government tools create shared and integrated digital administrative architectures across levels in Europe. Following the second generation of EAS research, this paper suggests that EAS may be conceived as featuring administrative order formation that consists of a compound -thus differentiated -and accumulated set of institutions, decision-making processes, behavioural patterns, and values (Egeberg 2006; Trondal 2010) . Compound administrative spaces more generally are typically characterised by the co-existence of multiple and co-evolving institutions, decision-making dynamics and accountability practices. In compound administrative spaces, decision-making dynamics are likely to co-exist but the mix may change over time as well as between different institutional contexts (Olsen 2010) . Thus, the nuts and bolts of EAS are ultimately determined by how trade-offs between decision-making and accountability dynamics are handled by actors in everyday decision making processes as well as in periods of institutional creation, reformation and dismantling (Wilson 1989: 327 
Independence
First, EAS necessitates the rise of an independent administrative capacity at a European level, notably the rise of relatively permanent and separate institutions -organised according to principles of organisation that cross-cut domestic government institutions -that are able to act relatively independent from member-state governments. The rise of great powers through history has more often than not been associated with the growth of independent power capacities (Kennedy 1989 ). This section shows how the growth of administrative capacities not only within the Commission but also in institutions outside the Commission may contribute to strengthening the independent capacities of the Commission to act. This section suggests that institutions outside the Commission in practice tend to supply the Commission with relevant organisational capacities -and thus facilitate the formation of EAS. In addition to in-house organisational capacities the Commission is supplied with the auxiliary capacities composed of expert committees (ECs), EU agencies, and the EP administration. Moreover, the studies reported below suggest that the supply of independent organisational capacities of EAS contributes to certain behavioural dynamics among the personnel, ultimately forging institutional independence.
The rise of common political order necessitates the rise of independent administrative resources and capacity. Envisaged already by Saint-Simon in 1814 (1964 , one necessary factor in building common political order is the establishment of common institutions, including a permanent congress independent of national governments serving the common interest. In a European context it necessitates the rise of separate institutions that are able to act relatively independent from member-state governments. Jean Monnet early intended to create a small but indeed independent Commission hired on secondment contracts and intentionally not exceeding 200 officials. The present Commission houses around 35,000 officials, where most officials are hired on permanent posts for life. Of this workforce, only officials engaged in policy-making functions (ADs) are emphasised here. Divided by the number of DGs in the Commission, there are on average approximately 300 ADs per DG (Statistical Bulletin of Commission Staff 01/2011). The most recent expansion of the EU administration, however, is found at the level below the Commission, most notably among EU agencies (totalling 43 at present (2012)). These also include financial supervisory bodies set up as a response to the recent financial crisis in Europe, and the European Institute of Innovation and Technology as EU's new capacity for reinforcing innovation capacity.
Studies suggest that the organisational capacity built up inside the Commission in practice tends to safeguard its autonomy vis-à-vis member-state governments. Yet, a long-held myth has lingered that nationality affects the internal functioning of the Commission. As claimed by Amitai Etzioni (2004: 1) , '[t] he Commission is composed of national representatives'. Observations reported in recent research, however, largely challenge such claims. This section shows that the Commission is certainly not a 'hothouse' for intergovernmentalism. Largely supporting pioneer studies on Commission officials (Egeberg 1996); Trondal (2012a) suggests that the Commission administration has remained fairly independent of influence from memberstate governments. Studies show that both permanent and temporary officials in the Commission act fairly independently of member-state influence (e.g. Trondal 2010 ). Commission officials, notably the seconded national experts, indicate a rather low degree of identification with their national governments and tend to enjoy infrequent contacts towards their 'home administration' (Murdoch and Trondal 2012) . Parallel observations are made in the College of Commissioners, however, with emphasis on Commissioners' (portfolio) role perceptions (Egeberg 2006) .
Faced with an increasing agenda overload, one supplementary strategy available to the Commission in addition to building in-house administrative capacities is to import a large number of external experts when preparing initiatives and drafting new legislation. The Commission often possesses sufficient internal knowledge to modulate proposals without the help of external expertise. What is equally important is information on how memberstates and important interest groups may react. For that reason the Commission is not only increasingly dependent upon external expertise but also on external help to assess the likely obstacles that lie ahead in terms of competing preferences represented by the member-states and societal interests. The Commission has therefore developed several techniques to import expert advice during the early stages of the policy-making process. Recent updated estimates count as many as 1,237 Commission expert committees (ECs) -unevenly distributed among Commission DGs (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2008) . Comparing the size of the Commission workforce and the expert committee system, Gornitzka and Sverdrup (2008: 13) state that '[i]n fact, there is about one expert group per eight persons working as an official in the European Commission'. ECs exist primarily in the policy domains of the Commission and there are considerably fewer expert groups in the internal services -such as the General Secretariat. Essential for our argument, ECs tend in practice to strengthen the administrative capacities of most policy DGs for two main reasons. Firstly, ECs are typically subordinated directly under single DGs. Most committees report to their parent DG only and seldom to other DGs. Secondly, most ECs are single-task entities largely mirroring the portfolio organisation of the DGs (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2008) .
In addition to invite additional capacities through ECs, the Commission has in practice also EU agencies and networks of independent national agencies at its disposal. First, EU agencies may supply the Commission with relevant administrative and executive capacity. Due to their growing numbers, 'agencification' is a well-known phenomenon within Europe's national executives (Christensen and Laegreid 2011; Pollitt et al. 2004; Wettenhall 2005) . The 'agency fever' at the EU level has been accelerating more recently (Dehousse 2008; Kelemen 2002) . Since the early 1990s more than 40 EU agencies have been created. Several of the currently existing agencies are granted some amount of formal decision-making power, while the remaining agencies have tasks such as information gathering, technical support and administration (Groenleer 2009 ). Most EU agencies have restricted de jure powers, particularly with regard to making decisions. In addition to EU agencies, networks of national independent agencies have mushroomed, particularly with a role in facilitating the implementation of EU regulation (Eberlein and Grande 2005; Thatcher and Coen 2008) . These networks have developed largely on the basis of pre-existing bodies and contributed to the accumulation and layering of administrative structures that facilitate the implementation of EU regulation.
The mushrooming of EU agencies and administrative networks has occurred in parallel with expansion of the Commission services. The most recent boom of parallel 'executive' bodies at EU-level (outside the Commission and the Union Council) thus does not seem to have put the Commission's expansion on a halt (Egeberg et al. 2012) . In sum, both the Commission and EU-level agencies have acquired increased administrative capacity during recent years, partly due to a general strengthening of supranational executive powers, but also due to subsequent enlargements. Today, the Commission officially states that EU-level agencies have become an 'important part of the EU's institutional machinery' (Commission 2008: 2).
Finally, even the EP administration is shown to supply the Commission with relevant administrative resources. Since the EP was established there has been a dramatic growth in its General Secretariat. According to Corbett et al. (2011: 219) the number of posts increased from 37 in 1952 , almost 2000 in 1979, nearly 3000 posts by 1984, to the around 6000 officials currently working for the EP. The expansion of the EP administration has come in the wake of increase in the number Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) (from 78 to 785), nationalities (six to 27) and working languages (four to 23), as well as the major task expansion of the EP. The EP's administrative support structure is mainly organised in three parts. 1) The General Secretariat 2) the staff of the EP's political groups, and 3) the MEPs' personal assistants. In a recent study, show that EP officials have a multiplicity of contacts as part of their daily work. However, the most important contact point reported is the Commission. EP officials also tend to emphasis most strongly arguments from the Commission, next to those from the Council. Thus, the Commission seems to be the key interlocutor also for the EP administration. In sum, therefore, the Commission has gained profound auxiliary organisational capacities at its disposal in addition to its increased in-house capacity.
Integration
Empirically it is often observed that the rise of common administrative space do not result in coherent systems consisting of perfectly-integrated and monolithic institutions. Administrative spaces do not typically 'hang together', exhibiting coherence and consistency. Instead, different components of administrative centres are observed to overlap, counteract, layer and sometimes be out of synch rather than being integrated, co-ordinated and 'ordered' (Orren and Skowronek 2004) . Compound administrative spaces are typically characterised by the co-existence of multiple and co-evolving decision-making and accountability dynamics.
Supplementing the vertical specialisation of administrative systems, the internal integration of administrative systems is also increasingly documented within national governments -notably enhancing the role of Prime Ministers' and Presidential Offices (Poguntke and Webb 2005) -thus reasserting centres of executive government (Christensen and Laegreid 2011; Peters 2004) . Similarly, one strand of contemporary research suggests that the Commission has become increasingly integrated. Bureaucratic integration is observed both as regards intra-service decision-making processes inside the Commission as well as regards the Commission's relationship towards outside actors -such as international organisations, EU agencies, and domestic governments (Kassim 2006; Trondal 2010) . The history of the Commission documents periods of internal integration. Best known, perhaps, is the legacy of the Delors Commission (1985-94), characterised by presidential steering and a relative disregard of administrative routines (Christiansen 2008: 63; Kassim 2006) . 'At the end of Delors' ten-year tenure at the helm of the Commission its potential for political leadership […] had been demonstrated conclusively' (Christiansen 2008: 63) . Essentially, however, the power-base of these presidents and their policy initiatives were often not safeguarded through bureaucratic capacity building within the Commission. A relative downgrading of bureaucratic organisation was also observed throughout the Monnet Presidency decades earlier. However, the power base of previous Commission Presidents such as Monnet and Delors was largely based on their personal capacities. Contemporary internal integration of the Commission is centred on building organisational capacities around the President, partly by reforming the Secretariat General (SG) into an administrative service centre at the disposal for the President.
A second strand of recent research, however, highlights that presidentialisation of the Commission merely supplements the inherent horizontal specialisation and 'silo-isation' of the services (e.g. Trondal 2012b). A recent study suggests limitations to internal cohesion of the Commission services (Trondal 2012b) . Integrative ambitions of the Commission President and the SG sometimes exceed their integrative capacities. The horizontal interlocking role of the SG tends to collide with the organisational resources embedded in the policy DGs. Administrative integration of the Commission seems in practice sometimes to become dashed by the horizontal specialisation of the DGs. 'Silo thinking' is largely organisationally vested within the Commission services. Studies reveal that contact patterns among Commission officials within policy DGs are strongly driven by their portfolios (Trondal 2012b) . Recent research also confirm that informal networks among Commission officials is guided by the horizontal specialisation of the Commission administration, thus largely clustered within DGs and thus supporting the 'silo logic' reported above (Peterson 2011; Suvarierol 2007: 118) . Moreover, patterns of co-operation and conflict inside the Commission administration are associated with the formal organisational boundaries of the services. Trondal (2012b) also reports that this effect is sustained and strengthened by the compulsory staff rotation system inside the Commissionemphasising intra-service rotation of personnel. Finally, Commission officials mainly direct their identities towards the DGs and only secondary towards the unit level and the Commission as a whole (Trondal 2012b ).
In sum, research suggests that internal integration of the Commission does not seem to profoundly penetrate the services. Reflecting the Neo-Weberian model outlined by Ongario (2010) , two behavioural logics tend to co-exist within the Commission administration, albeit embedded and layered within different organisational sub-units. A portfolio logic seems to be overwhelmingly present within policy DGs. The portfolio logic serves as the foundational dynamic at the heart of policy DGs and it seems to be activated fairly independently of bureaucratic integration at the helm of the Commission. This observation echoes images of the Commission administration as fragmented with weak capacities for hierarchical steering, accompanying inter-service 'turf wars' that is marginally compensated by presidential control and administrative integration (e.g. Coombes 1970; Egeberg 1996; Page 1992; Spinelli 1966) . The Commission has been pictured as organisationally segmented (Hooghe 1997; Page 1992: 135) and with an alleged 'management deficit' (Metcalfe 1992; Levy 2006) . Kassim and Peterson (2011) , however, suggest that this inherent logic of portfolio is increasingly challenged by bureaucratic integration, mainly forged by the Commission SG.
These findings hold both when comparing permanent and temporary Commission officials (Trondal et al. 2008) , and when 'controlling for' recent managerial reforms inside the Commission (e.g. Kassim 2009 ). Recent administrative reforms of the Commission have been described as historic, profound in depth, and wide-ranging in scope (Barzelay and Jacobsen 2009; Bauer 2009; Schön-Quinlivan 2006 ). Yet, the behavioural logics among Commission officials seem not profoundly transformed by these reforms (Trondal 2012b) . By contrast, the two behavioural logics reported above seem to be mainly guided by the organisational specialisation of the Commission services and the accumulation of relevant administrative capacities inside the Commission.
Co-optation
The independence and integration of the Commission has not only implications for how Commission officials act and think. The emergence of independent and integrated European administrative capacities also increases its ability to co-opt administrative sub-centres by stealth -notably EU-level agencies and domestic agencies, but probably also agencies within other international organisations thus reaching into global administrative architectures.
Studies suggest that the inherent portfolio logic within the Commission services has certain effects on its ability to co-opt administrative sub-units. This is reflected in the development of direct links between Commissioners and 'their' EU agencies (Groenleer 2009: 130) . A recent study confirms that the pivotal role of the Commission in the daily life of EU agencies is evident within policy areas in which the Commission itself disposes over considerable organisational resources ). This study also shows that in the policy formulation phase, the 'parent' Commission DG is seen by EU agency officials as particularly influential. At the policy implementation stage, by contrast, influence is tilted relatively towards one's own agency and national agencies, although the Commission is considered to be the most powerful institution outside one's own agency also at this stage . The Commission thus stands out as more pivotal in the daily life of EU agencies and therefore supplier of administrative capacities for the Commission. The pivotal role of the Commission in the daily life of EU agencies becomes even more evident within policy areas in which the Commission itself disposes over considerable organisational resources.
Secondly, the portfolio organisation of the Commission is also reflected in the relationships that have evolved between the Commission and domestic agencies. Also domestic agencies seem to supply the Commission with relevant administrative capacities, particularly in the application of EU regulations. Studies show that implementation is multi-dimensional with several sources of power represented more or less simultaneously. Even the daily practicing of EU legislation at the national level is no longer solely in the hands of national governments although the role of ministerial departments is pivotal. Egeberg and Trondal (2009) show that national agency officials who report that the Commission is important as regards their implementation practices also tend to have direct contacts with the Commission. This study indicates that the Commission actively takes part in the practicing of EU legislation at the national level. In short, the Commission seems to co-opt domestic agencies. Domestic agencies may thus supply the Commission with relevant administrative capacities, however, particularly at the implementation stage of the decision-making cycle.
Institutionalisation
The final dimension of development of EAS is the institutionalisation of this administrative arrangement. The idea of institutionalisation implies creating stability and regularity within structures, so that patterns of behaviour become predictable and uncontested. Given the legalistic nature of administration within the EU and EAS, there is an inherent institutional structure for administration. The integrated characteristic of EAS discussed above reflects some aspects of this institutionalisation. Two caveats are, however, needed. First, institutionalisation tends to take time, and it may thus be premature to assess institutionalisation of EAS and many of its new institutional innovations. Secondly, institutionalisation is hard to measure and thus difficult to assess. Nevertheless, institutionalisation remains an essential analytical dimension of EAS.
In addition to the structural aspects of the EAS there is also a normative, ideational element involved. As Selznick (1957) has argued, institutionalisation involves infusing a structure with values greater than necessary for the mechanical achievement of their tasks. In terms of the EAS this normative basis of institutionalisation implies that there is some commitment to the Union and to the maintenance of existing patterns of governance within. In other words, maintenance of the existing administrative arrangements means something to the participants. This ideational basis of institutionalisation of EAS can be seen as having certain discursive and semantic elements. The need to transpose European directives into national law requires acceptance of some common standards of administration, and of administrative law (Hofmann and Turk 2006) . Thus, institutionalisation may accompany the rise of shared language for understanding administration within the EU becoming standard language for public administration in member-states; despite the broad differences in their administrative traditions (see Painter and Peters 2010) . This shifting of language and law also reflects the cooptive processes described above.
As well as the institutionalisation of the language and formats for public administration within EAS the structural elements of administration and governance may also be institutionalised. This approach to institutionalisation may be conceptualised more in terms of the efficiency gains available from EAS and the reduction of transaction costs. Just as the creation of the Euro has been justified as a means of reducing transaction costs within the European economy, the institutionalisation of EAS can be seen as reducing administrative costs across the Union. This institutionalisation has been true for some time for the central administrative organs in the Commission but also the 'Eurocracy' of EU agencies and other ancillary organisations of the EU (Busuioc et al. 2012; Kelemen 2002) . In these cases the institutionalisation involves the creation of common administrative capacities that extend beyond the remit of the Commission. EU agencies have created common regulatory standards as well as common administrative patterns in different policy areas, thus institutionalising a broader administrative space.
The final point about the institutionalisation within EAS is that much of the decision-making practice has remained stable for some years. As pointed out above, despite some apparent major administrative changes in the Commission administration in the post-2000 period, the basic behavioural orientations of the staff within this administrative system have remained largely stable (Trondal 2012b) . Thus, it would appear that the normative and behavioural patterns have been institutionalised sufficiently to resist profound change.
Conclusion
The emergence of EAS mirrors the development of all the institutions of the EU. The four dimensions of EAS outlined here help to understand the nature of this construct and its impact on the performance of the EU and the constituent states. It is important to note here that the EAS is indeed a construct that is difficult to identify in any clear and tangible form but yet does influence the behaviour of individual administrators and organisations. This construct does help us to understand the influences of membership in the Union have on the practices and the ideas of administrators within the member-states and the Union itself. It helps to demonstrate the existence of pervasive influences of EAS on the members and demonstrates the importance of ideas and discourses in shaping administrative action.
This research agenda paper has suggested that EAS features a transformation of administrative order that can analytically be grasped in terms of institutional independence, integration, co-optation and institutionalisation. Taken together, these elements suggest that EAS may be understood as a compound and differentiated system of institutions, decision-making processes, behavioural patterns, and values. These elements suggest that EAS features the transformation of the inherent administrative order and the rise of an emergent common administrative system. Compound administrative spaces such as EAS are characterised by the co-existence of multiple and co-evolving institutions, decision-making dynamics and accountability practices. In compound administrative spaces, decision-making dynamics are likely to coexist but the mix may change over time as well as between different institutional contexts. The everyday world of EAS is determined by how tradeoffs between decision-making and accountability dynamics are accommodated by actors in everyday decision making processes as well as in periods of institutional creation, reformation and dismantling. During periods of stress and uncertainty, as witnessed in Europe at present, existing balances in EAS as regards institutional independence, integration, co-optation and institutionalisation may change. Periods of change often accompany calls for reform (Coen and Roberts 2012) , through which key elements of EAS may become subject to debate. 
